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ovel artiﬁcial genetic systems
with twelve bases instead of
four [1]. Bacteria that can
be programmed to take photographs
[2] or form visible patterns [3]. Cells
that can count the number of times
they divide [4]. A live polio virus
“created from scratch using mailorder segments of DNA and a viral
genome map that is freely available
on the Internet” [5]. These are some
of the remarkable, and occasionally
disturbing, fruits of “synthetic biology,”
the attempt to construct life starting
at the genetic level. In terms of their
scale and ambition, these efforts
go beyond traditional recombinant
DNA technology. Rather than simply
transferring a pre-existing gene from
one species to another, synthetic
biologists aim to make biology a true
engineering discipline.
In the same way that electrical
engineers rely on standard
capacitors and resistors, or computer
programmers rely on modular blocks
of code, synthetic biologists wish to
create an array of modular biological
parts that can be readily synthesized
and mixed together in different
combinations. The Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) has a
Registry of Standard Biological Parts
that supports this goal by indexing
biological parts that have been built,
and offering assembly services to
construct new parts, devices, and
systems [6]. Systems, devices, parts, and
DNA represent descending levels of
complexity—systems consist of devices,
and devices consist of parts composed
of DNA. The idea behind a registry
of parts is that these parts can, and
should, be recombined in different
ways to produce many different types
of devices and systems. Although the
registry currently contains physical
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DNA, its developers believe that, as
DNA synthesis technology becomes
increasingly inexpensive [7], the
registry will be composed largely of
information and speciﬁcations that
can be executed in synthesizers just
as semiconductor chip designs are
executed by fabrication ﬁrms.
Synthetic biology has already
produced important results, including
more accurate AIDS tests and the
possibility of unlimited supplies of
previously scarce drugs for malaria
[8]. Proponents hope to use synthetic
organisms to produce not only
medically relevant chemicals but also
industrial materials, including biofuels
such as hydrogen and ethanol [9]. At
the same time, synthetic biology has
engendered numerous policy concerns.
From its inception, commentators have
raised issues ranging from bioethical
and environmental worries to fears of
bioterrorism—indeed, the US Central
Intelligence Agency released a report
in 2003 called “The Darker Bioweapons
Future” that explicitly referred to the
dangers posed by the possibility of
genetically engineered viruses [10].
There is, however, one area that
has been largely unexplored until this
point—the relationship of synthetic
biology to intellectual property
law. Two key issues deserve further
attention. First, synthetic biology
presents a particularly revealing
example of a difﬁculty that the law
has frequently faced over the last
30 years—the assimilation of a new
technology into the conceptual limits
posed by existing intellectual property
rights. There is reason to fear that
tendencies in the way that US law has
handled software on the one hand
and biotechnology on the other could
come together in a “perfect storm”
that would impede the potential of
the technology. Second, synthetic
biology raises with remarkable clarity
an issue that has seemed of only
theoretical interest until now—the
0389

tension between different methods
of creating “openness.” On the one
hand, one standard mechanism for
creating openness has involved putting
material in the public domain, outside
the world of property. On the other,
synthetic biology researchers may want
to use intellectual property rights to
create a “commons,” just as developers
of free and open source software use
the leverage of software copyrights to
impose requirements of openness on
future programmers, requirements
greater than those attaching to a public
domain work. But synthetic biology,
unlike software, is not necessarily
protected by copyright. Should we
rethink the boundary lines between
intellectual property and the public
domain as a result?

The Perfect Storm: Flawed Biotech
Law Meets Flawed Software Law?
Intellectual property law in the US has
already had difﬁculty incorporating the
revolutionary technologies from which
synthetic biology draws inspiration—
biotechnology and computers. US
patent law requires that inventions be
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“nonobvious” to the ordinary scientist
working in the area. Yet, in the area of
biotechnology, years after methods for
cloning genes have become routine and
widely known, the US Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit continues to treat
the gene products of such methods as
patentable [11]. By the Federal Circuit’s
reasoning, what matters is not whether
a practicing biologist would ﬁnd a
particular invention obvious, but rather
per se rules about nonobviousness
developed for chemical inventions in
the mid-20th century [12].
While biotechnology has mainly
posed difﬁculties for patent law,
computers have posed both copyright
and patent problems. Copyright covers
original works of expression, explicitly
excluding works that are functional.
Patent law requires functionality;
however, it had traditionally been
understood to exclude formulas and
algorithms. Thus, software—a machine
made of words, a set of algorithmic
instructions devoted to a particular
function—seemed to ﬁt neither the
copyright nor the patent box. It was
too functional for copyright, too
close to a collection of algorithms
and ideas for patent. What’s more,
certain economic aspects of software,
including its high propensity to
display “network effects” (increased
utility based on increased numbers of
users) led scholars to believe that both
copyright and patent were ill-suited
to encourage innovation without
discouraging competition. Several sui
generis, or custom-made, intellectual
property regimes were proposed as an
alternative.
As a result of statements by the US
Congress and actions by the courts,
software ended up being covered by
both copyright and patent in the US—a
result that most scholars thought was
far from ideal. Court refusals to allow
patent examiners to use unwritten
information to determine whether a
particular patent application is obvious
[13] may also have a disproportionate
impact on computer-related inventions.
Because much knowledge in the ﬁeld
of computer technology is not written
down in journal articles, it may be
hard for a patent examiner to ﬁnd
speciﬁc written references testifying to
information that is generally known.
Additionally, many scholars have
argued that the Federal Circuit allows
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unduly broad patents to issue in the
area of software [14].
The specter of broad patents has
already reared its head in the ﬁeld
of synthetic biology. Consider patent
6,774,222, issued by the US Patent
and Trademark Ofﬁce on August 10,
2004 [15]. The patent, issued to the
US Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), is entitled “Molecular
Computing Elements, Gates and FlipFlops.” This patent covers using the
combination of nucleic-acid binding
proteins and nucleic acids to set up
data storage as well as logic gates that
perform basic Boolean algebra. As the
patent document notes, the invention
could be used not only for computation
but also for complex (“digital”) control
of gene expression. The broadest claim
does not limit itself to any particular
set of nuclei-acid binding proteins or
nucleic acids. Moreover, the claim uses
language that would cover not only the
“parts” that performed the Boolean
algebra but also any device and system
that contained these parts. Such a
patent would seem effectively to patent
the basic functions of computing when
implemented by one likely genetic
means. Would such a foundational
patent hold up in court?
Given the low nonobviousness
threshold that the Federal Circuit has
set in the area of biotechnology, there
is some possibility that the court would
apply a similarly low threshold here.
The Federal Circuit’s reluctance to
allow unwritten knowledge to be used
in determining nonobviousness may
also impose a low threshold. Thus, even
if, at the time the HHS invention was
made, individuals working in the ﬁeld
knew that many computing functions
could readily be performed using DNAbased “genetic switches,” this unwritten
knowledge might not be factored into
the nonobviousness determination.
Notably, the HHS patent is not unique
in its breadth [16,17].
Considerable historical evidence,
including evidence from virtually
every important industry of the 20th
century, suggests that broad patents
on foundational research can slow
growth in the industry [18]. In the area
of computer hardware, the specter
of broad patents loomed large in the
US until government action forced
licensing of the AT&T transistor patent
as well as patents obtained by Texas
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Instruments and Fairchild Instruments
on integrated circuits. Fortunately,
software was already a robust industry
before broad software patents became
available. Biotechnology’s foundational
technologies—monoclonal antibodies
and recombinant techniques—either
were not patented or were made
available widely at reasonable cost.
Synthetic biology may be coming of
age under different circumstances, at
the juncture of two technologies with
which the law is already struggling.
To be sure, to the extent that
foundational patents are held by
universities or government institutions,
they may not be asserted aggressively
so as to block research. However, in
addition to the problem of broad
foundational patents, there is the
possibility of a plethora of narrower
patents (some of which may fall within
the scope of the foundational patents).
For example, scientists at Boston
University have ﬁled patents that claim
the use of DNA to produce speciﬁc
gene regulation mechanisms such as a
multi-state oscillator [19–21]. MIT and
the company Sangamo have patents on
various types of DNA binding proteins.
At least in the area of information
technology, there is evidence that
patent thickets [22] or “anti-commons”
[23] create difﬁculties for subsequent
researchers above and beyond those
created by foundational patents. (The
situation in biotechnology is less
clear; compare [24] and [25].) This is
because many products in information
technology represent combinations of
dozens, if not hundreds, of patented
parts. Not only does a crowded patent
landscape create the possibility of
“hold up” by a previously unknown
patent holder who emerges only after
others have invested large sums of
money in the area of the patented
invention, but to the extent that
patent rights holders rely upon reachthrough royalties to secure revenue,
standard economic theory predicts that
product output by the improver will
be suboptimal. Moreover, while ﬁrms
that work in information technology
have sometimes succeeded in pooling
patents, particularly patents around
industry standards, such efforts have
also been stymied by failure on the
part of participating ﬁrms to disclose
relevant patents [26]. In any event,
because synthetic biology encompasses

March 2007 | Volume 5 | Issue 3 | e58

not only information technology
but also biotechnology, the absence
of successful patent pools in the life
sciences is cause for concern.

A Synthetic Biology Commons?
These intellectual property concerns
have not gone unnoticed. The MIT
scientists involved with the Registry
of Standard Biological Parts are
sufﬁciently concerned that they have
created the BioBricks Foundation,
which might serve to coordinate a
synthetic biology “commons.” The
idea of a synthetic biology commons
draws inspiration, in part, from the
prominence of the open source
software model as an alternative
to proprietary software. Unlike
proprietary software developers, open
source software producers make
their source code freely available
for improvement, modiﬁcation, and
redistribution. Certain types of open
source licenses also have a “commonsexpanding” aspect: these “copyleft”
licenses not only make source code
freely available, but they also require
those who distribute improvements
to the source code to make the
improvements available on the same
terms (see [27], which discusses GNU
General Public License and other
“copyleft” licenses). Copylefted software
relies heavily on the existence of
property rights—speciﬁcally, copyright
in the source code. Because of this
copyright, users of the copylefted
software necessarily use it subject to the
terms of the license.
Synthetic biologists might argue that
strings of DNA bases are comparable
to source code and that DNA strings
could therefore also be covered by
copyright. However, software itself
ﬁts poorly into copyright’s categories.
The US Congress indicated a desire
that software be covered by copyright,
but left it to the courts to work out
the method of doing so. As developed
by the courts, copyright protection in
software is thin—for example, source
code is generally protected against
verbatim copying. But even with source
code, if the code is entirely dictated
by functional concerns or has become
an industry standard, it may not be
protected by copyright at all.
Where does this leave synthetic
biology? There are two major
obstacles to establishing copyright.
First, unlike software, the products of
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synthetic biology are not discussed as
copyrightable subject matter in the
US copyright statute. Thus, a court
that wished to ﬁnd that material
copyrightable would have to do so
by analogy. Second, even if courts
were willing to make such an analogy,
there are the internal restrictions of
US copyright law, which does not
cover functional articles or methods
of operation, and requires expressive
choices. As a matter of legal doctrine,
the answer to whether an expressive
choice had been made might depend
upon the type of synthetic biology
involved. For example, the construction
of DNA sequences using base pairs
that do not exist in nature might
allow signiﬁcant room for expressive
choice. Such DNA sequences might
be protected by copyright, at least
against verbatim copying. However,
most synthetic biologists working today,
including those at MIT, are working
within the conﬁnes of the existing
genetic code. This code constrains
the expressive choices that they make,
making copyright protection less likely.
Thus, in the case of synthetic biology,
the ability to invoke copyright is by no
means clear. An obvious alternative
is patents. One example of a patentbased commons is that created by the
group Biological Innovation for an
Open Society (BIOS). BIOS is using
patent protection on a few key plant
gene transfer technologies to force
licensees to put improvements to those
technologies into the commons [28].
Although some have suggested that the
BIOS approach could raise concerns
about antitrust and patent misuse [29],
the concern should be relatively small
given BIOS’s mission to expand the
commons and the relatively permissive,
rule-of-reason-based approach taken
by contemporary US antitrust law. The
more pressing problem for projects like
the MIT Registry of Standard Biological
Parts—which contains more than 2,000
standardized parts—is expense. A
single patent can cost tens of thousands
of dollars to secure.
Of course, to the extent that a few
broad patents—like the HHS patent
noted above—might effectively cover
many of the parts in the registry, the
patent option becomes more plausible.
In this scenario, the registry would
essentially be exploiting ﬂaws in the
current patent system for commonsexpanding purposes. The difﬁculty
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would be to identify an area of
inventive territory that was quite broad
but nonetheless not suggested either by
prior broad patents or by information
already in the public domain.
Alternatively, the registry might try to
attract statements of non-assertion by
other patentees, on the model of recent
statements by IBM, Sun Microsystems,
and other ﬁrms, that they will not assert
their patents against anyone working
on open source software. Indeed, the
fact that many synthetic biology patents
are currently held by academic and
government institutions may make such
statements of assertion a real possibility.
To the extent that institutions with
synthetic biology patents vowed not to
assert their patents against academic
researchers, such a move would be a
salutary development and a comfort
to those working on the registry. Nonassertion statements are not, however,
a property right. In order to secure
a property right, the owners of the
MIT registry would need a license
with explicit permission to sublicense.
Moreover, patents licensed to the
registry would have to cover, at least in
some fashion, parts that were important
for maintaining and expanding the
commons.
Another alternative for securing
an expanding commons might rely
on some kind of contract, such as a
“clickwrap” license over the BioBricks
Foundation data. This contractual
alternative does not require an
underlying property right. Instead, the
contract simply imposes conditions
as part of the price of access. One
problem with such contracts is that
they bind only those who receive the
technology from the entity imposing
the terms. Attempts to prevent leakage
to those not bound by the terms of the
contract can require strict restrictions
on information dissemination. For
example, for some time the publicly
funded International HapMap
Project (a database of human genetic
variation) used a clickwrap license.
This license required users of single
nucleotide polymorphism data to
refrain from combining it with their
own proprietary single nucleotide
polymorphism data in order to
seek product patents on haplotypes
(collections of single nucleotide
polymorphisms). In order to prevent
leakage of the data outside the conﬁnes
of this clickwrap license, to those who
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Table 1. Alternatives for Synthetic Biology
Disadvantagesa

Strategy

Advantages

Patents (20 years from time of patent application to
exclude others from use of invention)
Copyright (attaches immediately upon creation; exclusive
right to copy and improve that lasts for 70 years after
author’s death, or if work of corporate authorship, 95 years
from publication)
Contract (terms vary)

Clear property right basis for copyleft license (license that Expensive (approximately $25,000 per patent in the
requires improvements to be distributed freely)
US for complex inventions)
Clear property right basis for copyleft license; inexpensive Legal basis in the US for assertion of copyright
unclear—no explicit basis in the Copyright Act and
some theoretical arguments against

Sui generis (one of a kind) legislation (e.g., for “open”
databases or “social patents”)

Inexpensive
Narrowly tailored to problem

Copyleft license requires strict limits on information
dissemination
Legislative solutions are difﬁcult and slow

a
In all of the copyleft approaches, there are line-drawing issues. One has to be very careful regarding precisely what material is covered by the requirement.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050058.t001

would then have no obligation to
the HapMap commons, the license
required those who sought the data to
refrain from disseminating it to anyone
who had not signed on to the license.
Conventional publication of the data
was not possible. This condition is no
longer imposed because it is believed
that the database has reached a
sufﬁcient density to be self-sustaining
and to defeat subsequent patent claims.
But the old requirements indicate
one of the difﬁculties of the clickwrap
approach; the comparative weakness of
the contractual restraints paradoxically
requires extremely broad restrictions
on dissemination.
Finally, legislative proposals might
create sui generis property rights
mechanisms for protecting BioBricks
Foundation data. Indeed, the European
Union currently has sui generis
protection of data. The evidence
suggests, however, that strong property
rights protection is likely to hinder
rather than promote innovation [30].
A recent draft of the proposed “Treaty
on Access to Knowledge” offers an
alternative sui generis approach: under
this approach, member countries would
adopt legislation protecting “qualifying
open databases” from patents on
certain types of improvements for
a speciﬁed period of time (Article
5-6 of [31]). Various commentators
afﬁliated with the Access to Knowledge
proposal have also suggested the
possibility of “social patents” legislation:
under this approach, a type of patent
right could be secured at low or no
cost, but it could not be used for
exclusionary commercial purposes.
Although these sui generis alternatives
are quite intriguing, and certainly an
improvement over ordinary property
rights in databases, securing new
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legislation is a difﬁcult, uncertain,
and slow route. Table 1 summarizes
the advantages and disadvantages of
a sui generis strategy as well as other
strategies.
We close with one overarching
observation. Copyleft licenses, which
lead to the formation of an everexpanding commons, have worked
well—even brilliantly—in the software
context. These licenses have produced
well-functioning code, and they have
also constrained the threat posed by
copyright and patent, particularly
when such intellectual property could
be attached to an incipient industry
standard. Would they work as well in
synthetic biology? There is reason for
some caution. Intellectual property
rights are relatively unimportant as
incentives at any stage in the production
of copyleft software. They are important
mainly for the leverage they give to
the licensor. But synthetic biology
might be different. Though the uses
of synthetic biology are by no means
limited to biomedicine, at the end of
some biological chains of innovation
will lie the expensive development and
commercialization of a drug. While
taking a drug all the way through
clinical trials mandated by the US Food
and Drug Administration may not cost
as much as drug companies claim,
it does cost hundreds of millions of
dollars. Whether patent rights are the
best incentive mechanism for purposes
of eliciting pharmaceutical R&D is not
a question we can address here. Sufﬁce
it to say that our current system of
ﬁnancing pharmaceutical innovation
relies heavily on these rights. There
is no direct equivalent in the world of
free software. If a copyleft condition—
however drafted and imposed—did
attach to some of synthetic biology’s
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parts, care would have to be taken in the
design of the system, lest the result be to
make it impossible for that technology
to be developed into a patented therapy.
The BIOS licenses, which restrict the
copyleft condition to improvements
on the enabling technology and do
not constrain patenting on transgenic
plant products, provide an interesting
model. But the distinction between
enabling technology and product may
be easier to make in a situation like
that faced by BIOS, where the enabling
technology in question has a relatively
clear innovation trajectory, both in
terms of improvement to the technology
itself and in terms of production of end
products.
In the meantime, the decision,
already implemented, of the MIT
Registry of Standard Biological Parts
to place its parts into the public
domain certainly provides important
protection against the threat of patents
clogging innovation in the synthetic
biology space. Placing parts into the
public domain not only makes the
parts unpatentable, but it undermines
the possibility of patents on trivial
improvements. In the end, a public
domain strategy comparable to that
employed by the public Human
Genome Project may not be ideal, but
it is certainly a good start. 
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